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Charles Tilly’s Understanding of Contentious 




[Stinchcombe’s essay on my work] gives you jazz and science at the same time. I 
don’t know whether to call his work “jazzy science” or “scientific jazz”. Maybe it 
doesn’t matter. In real life, after all, smart human beings follow more than one road 
from past to future (Tilly 2007: 13).
For Charles Tilly1 one of the most difficult and sophisticated task for so-
cial scientists is the search for causes and principles of variations. He was 
obsessed with the importance of causal explanation for social science and 
devoted all his intellectual energy to specify social mechanisms in order 
to get closer to explanation. In his epistemological perspective, social ana-
lysts have to identify mechanisms and processes (that is, recurrent configu-
rations of specific social mechanisms) for explaining social phenomena. 
During all his life as a social analyst, he was preoccupied with tracing 
causal processes by identifying social mechanisms (transforming effects) 
that links causes and outcomes. From his early studies on migration and ur-
banization to his analyses on state formation, democratization and conten-
tion, all his sociological work underlines remarkably this epistemological 
concern. And, over the years, Tilly has elaborated a mechanism-and-proc-
ess approach to causation (Tilly 2001).
Although this concern was under discussion since his first studies, the 
way to achieve causal explanation was not initially fixed. To find social 
mechanisms in order to get closer to explanation was, as he said himself, 
1 I dedicated this essay to Chuck who influenced me and many of his students so deeply. 
I regret that I cannot discuss this essay with him and receive his cutting comments as he 
always did. I turn to Doug McAdam, one of his closer intellectual companions, to improve 
this essay. I am grateful to Doug and the editors of this volume for their stimulating com-
ments on this paper. 
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an “erratic itinerary” made of “sequences of trial, error, critique, correc-
tion, and reformulation” (1997: 12). During his intellectual itinerary, and 
without denying the importance of environmental mechanisms, he focused 
more intensively on the combination of relational and cognitive mecha-
nisms to explain political processes. Although interactive mechanisms 
were already central in Tilly’s work, social interactions combined with 
narratives (and shared understandings) became gradually more central 
in his theoretical framework. To concentrate on relational and cognitive 
mechanisms allowed him, first, to remain in his epistemological tracks by 
tracing mechanisms and processes at stake, and in fine to highlight causal 
explanation. Second, it offered Tilly a theoretical toolkit to emphasize both 
contingency and variation in social outcomes. 
Relational realism progressively constituted a theoretical stand in Tilly’s 
work. By analyzing the guerrilla force of Chiapas, he raised a set of old 
sociological questions on the link between discursive constructions and 
social processes, and our capacity to move from description to explanation 
by analysing discursive accounts. Tilly’s response was straightforward. 
After years of denial, I have come to think that failure to address these pressing 
questions directly […] has cramped the credibility and fruitfulness of what could 
be a rich renewal of relational realism 
He added: 
[i]t is time to rediscover the centrality of social transactions, ties, and relations to 
social processes and to investigate connection between social relation on one side, 
and social construction, on the other. Structural realism stands as the thesis, social 
construction as the antithesis […] and the relational realism as the hoped-for syn-
thesis (2002: 5).
The interplay between social transactions and cognitive processes became 
central in his work. However, social interactions and narratives are not 
separate from institutional settings. Relational realism is a concrete way 
to connect structure and action, and this connection is ensured through 
dynamic processes.
The aim of this paper is to discuss Tilly’s intellectual itinerary in which 
social transactions and narratives became more central in his theoretical 
framework. I discuss this itinerary by narrowing my empirical focus to 
Tilly’s work on contention. As large-scale processes, first, I present a ge-
nealogy of Tilly’s definition of social movements. Second, I examine his 
reformulation of contentious repertoire. Third, I discuss the importance of 
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his theoretical thinking for a better understanding of small-scale processes 
such as people joining collective action. Finally, I conclude the paper with 
a few implications of Tilly’s theoretical framework for social scientists.
From Action to Interaction
Before Tilly’s pathbreaking book, From Mobilization to Revolution, the 
common view of social movement was a rather static understanding of 
protest politics centred on the analysis of organizations. Organizations 
constituted the basic unit of analysis of collective action. For Tilly pro-
test politics is much more complex than groups: it involves interactions. 
Moreover, “collective action is about power and politics” (1978). He thus 
proposed a definition of collective action that takes into account power and 
politics in an interactive framework. He defined social movements as 
a sustained series of interactions between powerholders and persons successfully 
claiming to speak on behalf of a constituency lacking formal representation, in the 
course of which those persons make publicly visible demands for changes in the 
distribution or exercise of power, and lack those demands with public demonstra-
tions of support (1984: 306).2
The understanding of social movements changed radically with Tilly’s 
works. He brought an interacting perspective in which social movements 
are thought of as political performances. In addition to bringing action into 
our conception of collective action, he allowed us to think of collective 
action in an interactive framework. Political performances are generated 
by a complex process, which is constructed through social interactions be-
tween powerholders and contenders on one side, and within contenders, on 
the other. A new world of research opened up. It opened a way to analyze 
forms (and variations among forms) of interactions between state and po-
litical challengers. It also opened up an avenue to study interactions among 
parties and to analyze identities people deploy in political claim-making. 
It pushed scholars to study identity construction (and identity transforma-
tion) in the course of multiple and complex social interactions. 
The analysis of protest through social interactions changed radically 
our conception of political contention. It was a theoretical revolution as 
2 Italics are mine.
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well as a methodological one.3 However, Tilly’s conception of contentious 
politics was not fixed for ever. His intellectual itinerary led him to strength-
en his understanding of social interactions. During the nineties, he con-
ceived protest as “a complex form of social interactions” (1993–1994: 5) 
that he frequently compared to a jam session. In that perspective “[s]ocial 
movements cannot have self-reproducing natural histories because they 
consist of intermittent interactions among challengers, powerholders, au-
diences, and often many other parties” (p.6).4 To focus on social interac-
tions implies to focus on shared knowledge, social scripts and narratives. 
Without common scripts and knowledge usually there is no interaction. 
As he said himself: “[s]ocial interactions vary in the extent to which they 
follow explicit models known to the parties” (1997: 1). Social interactions 
take place within relatively shared understandings, scripts and narratives 
that are transformed within the course of interactions. By combining social 
interactions with shared narratives Tilly was, first, able to specify social 
mechanisms and processes, and to get closer to explanation of contentious 
outcomes. Second, it allowed him to identify principles of variations. Polit-
ical contentions are contingent outcomes emerging through specific social 
interactions (between and within parties), and thanks to social narratives, 
scripts and shared understandings available to the actors. The interplay 
between interactions and narratives open up large sets of improvisations 
parallel to jam sessions.
Action Repertoire under Revision
The search for original invention in the social movement as a specific 
form of claim-making was central in Tilly’s studies of contentious poli-
tics (1986, 1995). He devoted intellectual efforts to understand invention 
but also transformation of social movement repertoire. In The Contentious 
French, he pointed out a shift of protest action repertoire from parochial, 
particularistic, and patronized forms of claim-making to autonomous, na-
tional, and modular forms of action. Transformations of action repertoires 
were explained by a profound alteration in social structures. One of the 
3 The understanding of social movements as political performances (sustained interac-
tions and claim-makings) brought new methodological tools to analyze protest politics: the 
“event protest analysis” (see Rucht et al. 1998).
4 Italics are mine.
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major alterations was the emergence of national politics. Tilly’s early un-
derstanding of action repertoire identifies one major interactive process, 
which is between state and challengers. Action repertoire was understood 
as a set of “limited number of known sequences of acting together” avail-
able to the contenders and “those established forms change as a result of 
collective learning and of changes in supporting social structure” (1997: 
11; 1984). As he underlined, both collective learning and social structure 
change usually in a concomitant process. They change as a bloc that af-
fects forms of popular collective action. In this early conception, shifts in 
action repertoires were explained by a limited view of social interactions. 
A rather structural account combined with an instrumental adaptation of 
contenders to social structure changes explain shift in action repertoire. 
Among several problems of his conception of action repertoire, one was 
particularly unacceptable for Tilly who was so obsessed by causal expla-
nation: “it offered no coherent causal account for changes in repertoires” 
(1997: 11). A deeper conception of social interactions in combination with 
social narratives and shared understandings was the way followed by Tilly 
to avoid this pitfall. Relational realism was the solution to the problem and 
a new understanding of action repertoire emerged. 
Repertoires rested on extensive shared understandings concerning possible forms 
of action and their links to possible outcome, […] they consisted of well-defined 
improvisatory performances within broadly defined scripts, […] each performance 
linked at least two parties of mutual claim makers, and […] changes in perform-
ances occurred as a consequence of strategic interactions between and among the 
parties, both within and outside open moments of contention (1997: 11).
The revised conception gave a larger place to intermittent interactions (be-
tween and within parties) and also a larger place to shared understandings 
and social narratives than in his previous works. This new formulation was 
adopted in Popular Contention in Great Britain.
Tilly’s Theoretical Perspective for Small-scale Processes
What can we learn from Tilly’s itinerary to explain people commitment 
to collective action? Tilly was interested in large-scale social processes. 
However, one of his last books, Why?, deals with small-scale processes. 
He studied the reasons given by people to justify what they do or to explain 
what takes place in their environment. Relational realism was also adopted 
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in his understanding of reason giving. Here again, social interactions, nar-
ratives and people practices are closely connected to one another.
As many social movement scholars underline, social interactions play 
a key role for joining collective action (e.g. Snow et al. 1986; McAdam 
1988; Klandermans 1993; Gould 1995). In line with White’s conception of 
social networks as “islands of meanings” (1992: 67), scholars stress that 
social interactions shape people’s cognitive map continuously which in 
turn facilitate (or not) their commitment to contentious politics (e.g., Passy 
1998, 2002). This conception allows making sense of variations. With 
Tilly’s theoretical framework we can go a step further. Borrowing the con-
ception of mental models from Bower and Morrow (1990), Tilly defined 
“Mental models as narratives” (1997: 21). He added: “[a] mental model 
ordinarily takes the form of play with actors who cause new events and 
changes appear as the text unfolds”. This conception brings new principles 
of variation in the understanding of how and why people join protest poli-
tics. His theoretical perspective invites us to take both social interactions 
and narratives as key social mechanisms to understand people activism. 
Social interactions certainly refine variation for joining political protest, 
but narratives too. Here again, we are much closer to a jam session than to 
a determinist path leading individuals to collective action. 
A Few Implications for Social Scientists
Tilly’s itinerary, moving from interactions to relational realism, led him to 
strengthen his conception of social relations but also to bring together in a 
coherent theoretical framework social relations and narratives. Investigat-
ing the interplay between social transactions and cognitive mechanisms 
led him to get closer to causation and to underline variations at stake. His 
theoretical thinking has many implications for social movements scholars 
as well as for social scientists. Due to space constraints, I will describe here 
only one theoretical implication and one methodological one. 
Tilly’s conceptual framework takes us away from social determinism 
as well as social action free of any constraints. Shared knowledge, scripts, 
and narratives are essential for social interactions to take place but those 
interactions take different forms (Tilly 1997). When actors (collective or 
individual) relate on extensive social scripts and abundant shared knowl-
edge they rely on strong routines for their interactions. By contrast, when 
scripts are thin and the knowledge shared among actors is low their interac-
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tions parallel improvisations. And between these two extremes, a vast con-
tinuum of social interactions takes place. Routine social interactions favour 
a sort of “reproduction” (usually made of imperfections) of known actions 
while improvisation favour more agency and variations among actions. 
This implies that social outcomes are contingent and made of important 
source of improvisation cause, first, by the multiple combinations existing 
between social interactions and shared understandings, and, second, by the 
incessant trial, error, and error corrections of social action (Tilly 1996). As 
Tilly declared: “any complex social structure that accomplished the mira-
cle of complete scripting and exact conformity would quickly freeze and 
crack” (1997: 6). Pure reproduction of social actions is thus impossible or 
is akin to a miracle. 
However, Tilly’s theoretical thinking does not imply that “social life 
lacks of order” (1997: 6). Social life is not founded on deep disorder. “So-
cial interactions wreaks it effects through script-adopting improvisation 
within limits set by existing social networks and shared understandings” 
(1997: 6). The frame within which social interactions take place is bounded 
by shared knowledge, existing scripts and narratives, and by networks at 
stake. Agency, creativity, and imprecision are thus under constraints. In ad-
dition, previous interactions limit what can happen in the next set of social 
relations. Social activity is thus path-dependent. For example, chains of 
interactions in contentious politics constrain next interactions. With Tilly’s 
theoretical thinking we are far away from social activity released from 
constraints. 
Social outcomes are not emerging from pure chaos, but from a rela-
tive chaotic interplay within limits set by existing shared understandings, 
common scripts and narratives, and by existing social networks. This theo-
retical thinking has an obvious methodological implication. Social analysts 
have to follow social outcomes made of improvisations within constraints 
fixed by social ties and shared understandings. Large-scale processes, such 
as contentious politics, should be analyzed by asking how historical ac-
cumulations of experiences provide shared understandings that constraint 
and guide next chains of interactions. Social scientists should focus their 
study on shared knowledge, common scripts and narratives, as well as on 
a set of social relations at stake in order to make sense of social outcomes. 
In addition, they have to take chains of interactions within a time-perspec-
tive. For example, Tilly advised social movement scholars to “describe 
interaction over collective claims as they measure the magnitudes of claim 
making, interactions, and outcomes”. He added “they must also explain the 
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loop from social organization to claims to interactions to outcomes, then 
back to new social organization and new claims” (2008: 31). Methodologi-
cally a key element is to sequence social processes to get closer to chains 
of interactions and to map shared understandings. For small-processes, 
such as processes letting people to join contentious politics, social scien-
tists should have similar concerns. Here again, we have to penetrate into 
sequences of action (Stinchcombe 2005). This implication, underlined here 
specifically for social movements scholars studying large-scale or small-
scale processes, are transposable for social scientists analyzing any other 
social and political outcomes.
The agenda for social analysts set by Tilly is rather ambitious. Moreo-
ver, it is not easy to implement. The main difficulties at stake are meth-
odological. For example, to trace chains of interactions are far from easy.5 
However one thing is clear, Charles Tilly’s legacy is considerable. His intel-
lectual itinerary (made of deep interactions and of revised scripts) allowed 
him to elaborate over the years a theoretical toolkit and an epistemology 
that opens up new roads for social research. He blew a revolutionary wind 
on social movement studies, and this wind goes largely beyond this field 
of research. 
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